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Theories of Recovery for Sexual





It has been scarcely more than a decade since a court first recog-
nized sexual harassment as a type of sex discrimination forbidden by
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' The first case allowing
such recovery was decided in 1976.2 Courts initially ruled that such
cases were beyond the purview of title VII.
Prior to 1976, activities constituting sexual harassment could be
cognizable as torts, but only if the particular circumstances of the
harassment happened to fulfill the elements of a recognized tort
cause of action.' One early argument against recognition of sexual
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana University. B.A. 1964, Stanford
University; J.D. 1975, Indiana University School of Law.
** Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University. B.A. 1976, DePauw
University; J.D. 1979, University of Chicago Law School.
*** Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana University. B.A. 1971, J.D.
1976, Indiana University.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elect. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d
1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir.
1977).
3. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1977).
4. Because recovery could be had in tort, some early decisions refused to recog-
nize sexual harassment as a form of discrimination covered by title VII. See Note, A
Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
1461 (1986).
harassment by males against females was that harassment could not
be title VII gender discrimination because a woman could also har-
ass a man, and homosexuals could harass members of the same sex.
This argument was specifically rejected in Barnes v. Costle.5
As a practical matter, this meant that compensation was available
only in the most egregious cases.' For example, if physical abuse
were involved, the victim could sue for battery and assault. In most
instances, even if the commission of a tort could be proved, liability
lay against the perpetrator only, not against the perpetrator's em-
ployer. This reduced the likelihood that victims of sexual harassment
would receive compensation. The availability of compensation was
also limited by the doctrine of employment at will, which permitted
an employer to discharge an employee without just cause.7
Thus, the 1976 interpretation of title VII as forbidding sexual har-
assment granted important new protection to individuals in the
workplace. In 1981, the further expansion of the concept of sexual
harassment granted even more protection, with recovery available
not only for the quid pro quo type of harassment recognized in 1976
but also for a harassing environment.'
Unfortunately, title VII's relatively meager remedies and its com-
plex procedural requirements render it inadequate to fully compen-
sate people who are injured by sexual harassment. As a result, many
individuals complaining of sexual harassment have increasingly ex-
plored other tort, contract, and statutory causes of action instead of
or in addition to their title VII claims. Many of these causes of ac-
tion are common law torts that plaintiffs traditionally have relied
upon in sexual harassment cases. Other causes of action involve new
theories such as expanded intentional tort theories, the emerging law
5. 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In a concurring opinion in Barnes, Judge
Maclinnon argued that sexual harassment should be treated differently from other
forms of discrimination because "sexual advances may not be intrinsically offensive
.... " Sexual advances involve "social patterns that to some extent are normal and
expectable." Id. at 1001.
6. See Seritis v. Lane, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1980).
7. For a discussion of the doctrine of employment at will and the current erosion
of that doctrine, see generally Krauskopf, Employment at Will: Survey and Critique of
the Modern At Will Rule, 51 UMKC L. REV. 189 (1983); Peirce, Mann & Roberts,
Employee Termination At Will: A Principled Approach, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
8. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Bundy court reached
its conclusion by examining other types of title VII cases, in which discrimination was
found because the employer created or condoned a substantially discriminatory work en-
vironment, whether or not the employees lost any tangible job benefits. Id. at 943-45.
The court noted that expansion of the theory was necessary - otherwise, an employer
could successfully harass an employee "by carefully stopping short of firing or taking any
other tangible action against her in response to her resistance." Id. at 945. Until Bundy,
courts had held that plaintiff could not prevail against the employer unless submission to
harassment was made a condition of employment. See, e.g., Walter v. KRGO Radio, 518
F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 1981).
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of wrongful discharge, and even RICO claims.
The purpose of this Article is to articulate and evaluate theories of
recovery for sexual harassment outside of title VII. It initially re-
views the development and expansion of the concept of sexual har-
assment. It then explores the reasons for a plaintiff to seek a cause of
action outside of title VII. Finally, the Article presents a discussion
of the application and advantages of each alternative theory of
recovery.
THEORY AND DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination.9 Both the Con-
stitution and title VII have protected women from sex discrimination
because of the traditional inequality of power between men and
women in our society.10 This inequality of power is magnified in the
employment context because of the employer's inherent power over
the employee in the employment relationship." Furthermore, the
work environment is typically male dominated. 2
An employer who sexually harasses an employee abuses his power
by taking advantage of it to subject workers to unwelcome sexual
conduct.' 3 Economic power is used as coercion to force demeaning
behavior on individuals.14 Such conduct, which has almost exclu-
sively involved male harassment of females,' 5 at a minimum reduces
9. Sexual harassment claims were first viewed as a form of disparate treatment,
or intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905, 909 (11th Cir.
1982).
10. See Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under
Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449-51 (1984) [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Claims].
11. See id. at 1452. Sexual harassment can also occur in other settings such as in
the classroom or in housing between landlord and tenant. Id. at 1451.
12. See id. at 1449 n.1.
13. For a general discussion, see Note, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1463-68 (1986)[hereinafter
Theory of Tort Liability]; Sexual Harassment Claims, supra note 10, at 1451-53; Conte
& Gregory, Sexual Harassment in Employment - Some Proposals Toward More Re-
alistic Standards of Liability, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 405, 415-19 (1982-83); Note, Sexual
Harassment in the Work Place. New Rules for an Old and Dirty Game, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 711, 712-14 (1981); Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual
Harassment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 151, 151-53 (1979) [hereinafter Legal Remedies].
14. See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 195-99 (1976). Sexual harassment "is largely a
way of expressing authority and dominance." Eliza Collins, editor, Harvard Business Re-
view, cited in NOW, Jan. 21, 1982, at 3, col. 2.
15. In the first case of sexual harassment brought by a male against his female
supervisor to reach a jury, the plaintiff won at trial. The award of $81,900 against the
supervisor was reversed by the Seventh Circuit, however, because it found that title VII
workers to sex objects, reinforces sexual stereotypes, and assaults in-
dividual dignity. It can also force the worker to choose between leav-
ing her job or tolerating the unwanted sexual behavior. Even if an
overt choice is not required, the harassment can foster a sense of
degradation that can lead to a loss of productivity and discourage
the worker from trying to advance.'6 Working in an environment of
sexual harassment often causes physical problems as well.17
Sexual harassment is defined by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature when(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as
the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive work environment. 8
Types (1) and (2) above comprise traditional sexual harassment,
known as.quid pro quo harassment, where submission is in some
way tied to a job benefit or the job itself. Type (3) covers the harass-
ing environment which later was recognized by the courts. The third
form of harassment differs from the first and second not only be-
cause job benefits are not necessarily threatened, but also because
the harassment can be committed by co-workers, and because it re-
quires several acts over a period of time.19 In addition, the employer
generally is vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment, 20 but
limits suits to those against the worker's employer. See Huebschen v. Dep't of Health
and Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1983).
16. See, e.g., Lamb v. Drilco, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 105 (S.D. Tex.
1983) (employer who discharged employee for poor performance violated title VII be-
cause the poor performance was caused by the sexual harassment of the employee's su-
pervisor). Many harmful economic consequences can result from harassment. See Legal
Remedies, supra note 13, at 152 n.7; Theory of Tort Liability, supra note 13, at 1464-
66.
17. Symptoms resulting from the tension and anxiety of working in a harassing
environment range from insomnia, nausea, and nervous tics to depression and complete
breakdowns. See Theory of Tort Liability, supra note 13, at 1464-65.
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1986).
19. Meritor Says. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404-05 (1986) (a harassing
environment created by a supervisor).
20. See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1985). "Every
circuit that has reached the issue has adopted the [EEOC's] rule imposing strict liability
on employers for acts of sexual harassment committed by their supervisory employees."
Id. at 604.
[A] "company" is a legal form; it can "act" only through its duly-appointed
agents. Where, as here, [a] supervisory employee is given absolute authority to
hire and fire, and uses this authority to extort sexual favors from [subordinate]
employees, the supervisor is, for all intents and purposes, the company . . ..
Courts have long used the doctrine of respondeat superior to impose liability on
principles for the intentional torts of their agents.
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many courts have held that the employer will not be held liable for
"environmental harassment" unless it knew or should have known of
the harassment, and did nothing to prevent it.21
This definition of sexual harassment is very broad, and encom-
passes not only the obvious demands for sexual favors in exchange
for jobs, but more subtle forms such as the gaining of job advantages
by a worker who has a sexual relationship with a supervisor to the
detriment of a more qualified worker,22 harassing conduct by cus-
tomers toward an employee that is tolerated by the employer,23 and
Id. at 605 (citation omitted).
21. See infra note 30. But see Jeplisen v. Wunnicke, 611 F. Supp. 78, 83 (D.
Alaska 1985):
Preventing sex discrimination in employment is too important a goal to turn
upon the vagaries of what does not constitute a tangible job benefit, as distin-
guished from what is considered an intangible benefit such as psychological
well-being at the workplace .... [Rather, Title VII provides] a statutory
right to a job environment where none of the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment are adversely impacted by sex discrimination. Employer knowl-
edge is not an element of [a hostile environment] Title VII sex discrimination
[claim].
Id. at 83.
22. See King v. Palmer, 598 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 778 F.2d 878
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The district court found that plaintiff had made a prima facie case of
sex discrimination by showing that a less qualified nurse was promoted over her and that
the promoted nurse was engaged in a sexual relationship with the supervisor making the
decision. Plaintiff lost at the trial level, however, because she was unable to present posi-
tive proof of a sexual relationship. The court indicated it would not rely on "rumor,
knowing winks and prurient overtones or on inferences allowed in divorce law." Id. at 69.
23. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 604-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(lobby attendant required to wear sexually revealing uniform suffered intangible harass-
ment when passersby made comments, gestures, and propositions). But cf. EEOC Deci-
sion No. 85-9 (May 7, 1985; released June 11, 1985), 54 U.S.L.W. 2009 (July 2, 1985).
Three employees of a women's clothing store were fired for refusing to wear swimsuits, a
cover-up, and appropriate accessories as part of a swimwear promotion. Their refusal was
based on their claims that these outfits were sexually revealing and would cause them to
be embarrassed and subjected to offensive remarks and conduct. The EEOC found that
since the women had not worn the outfits, they were never subjected to unwelcome sexual
conduct, and thus did not fit within the Sage Realty Corp. precedent. The EEOC went
on to examine whether the requirement alone constituted sexual harassment, and found it
would if wearing the outfit would likely have resulted in being subject to unwelcome
verbal or sexual activity. Based on testimony regarding prior male conduct in the store
and in the areas surrounding the store, the EEOC determined that the women would not
have been subjected to such behavior. The clerks testified that male customers, unlike
female customers, complimented them on their attractiveness and commented favorably
on their appearance in the clothes they wore at work. Men in the mall, particularly
janitors, repeatedly would pass in front of the store and stare at the sales clerks, and
some, primarily young men and high school boys, would knock on the glass panels to get
the women's attention. The women testified that this conduct occurred regularly, and was
disturbing to and interfered with their work, but that it was not vulgar and did not
include sexually explicit remarks, references, or gestures. Thus, the EEOC concluded
that the wearing of the outfit was unlikely to lead to unwelcome verbal or sexual activity.
conduct of co-workers that creates a "poisoned" psychological and
emotional work environment.24
Perhaps the broadest interpretation of sexual harassment was ap-
plied in the case of McKinney v. Dole.25 Plaintiff McKinney filed
various charges of age and sex discrimination, including sexual har-
assment. Among other allegations, she alleged that her supervisor
pursued her into her office and when she attempted to leave, the su-
pervisor prevented her from leaving by grabbing her arm and twist-
ing it.26 The employer argued that this activity did not support a
harassment claim since there were no sexual connotations to the inci-
dent.27 The court upheld plaintiff's right to sue under the sexual har-
assment theory, holding that any harassment or other unequal treat-
ment that would not occur but for the sex of the employee could, "if
sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of
employment under title VII. ''28 The McKinney holding goes a long
way toward equating sexual harassment with other forms of sex dis-
crimination, thereby robbing it of the usual requirement of some sort
of sexual overtone. The court treated sexual harassment much the
same as racial harassment has been treated in the racial discrimina-
tion context.29
As a result of the liberal interpretation given by the courts and the
EEOC, it is sometimes difficult to recognize the line between accept-
able and unacceptable sexually-oriented behavior in the workplace.30
It conceded, however, that this was a close judgment.
24. The first case to hold an employer liable for co-employee harassment was
Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980). In Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1 lth Cir. 1982), the court held that in order to hold the employer
liable, the plaintiff must show that it knew, or should have known about the harassment,
but failed to do anything about it. See also Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Ferguson v. E.I. du Pont Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Del.
1983) (refusing to follow the EEOC guidelines deeming an employer liable regardless of
whether acts were authorized or forbidden, or whether the employer knew or should have
known of the sexual harassment).
25. 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
26. Id. at 1132.
27. Id. at 1136.
28. Id. at 1138.
29. Cf. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506,
514-15 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
30. In the 1980 EEOC Guidelines, the Commission stated that it would "look at
the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances, and the
context in which the alleged incidents occur." This was interpreted to follow case law
holding that isolated incidents of flirtation, a vulgar remark, or a single request for a
date, without proof of a pattern of harassment, merely reflects moral interaction between
the sexes and is therefore not actionable. See, e.g., Clark v. World Airways, 24 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305 (D.D.C. 1980); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F.
Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978). In Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 211-12
(7th Cir. 1986), the court found no sexual harassment where the only incidents were a
request by the senior mechanic for the plaintiff to join him at a mall restaurant after
work, and his winks and suggestions that he be allowed to give her a rubdown. These
incidents were not so severe, debilatiting, or pervasive that they created a hostile environ-
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Studies show, however, that sexual misconduct is common. In an
early study conducted by Cornell University, seventy percent of the
respondents reported experiencing some form of sexual harassment."'
More recent studies still show that a large number of working
women are subjected to harassment in the workplace;32 however, de-
spite the pervasiveness of sexual harassment, there have been rela-
tively few suits. This may be partially the result of inadequacies of
early tort and title VII remedies. The number of suits is likely to
increase as these inadequacies are overcome.
LIMITATIONS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT SUITS UNDER TITLE VII
Remedial Limitations
Early sexual harassment suits relied on findings of harmful or of-
fensive touchings for success. The emotional harm caused by harass-
ment generally went unrecognized and uncompensated, as did recog-
nition that working in a harassing environment absent such
touchings could be harmful.3 Thus, the broad sexual harassment
definition of the EEOC was a big advance in protecting women in
their jobs. This protection is of limited value, however, because of
the remedial limitations contained in the Act. First, title VII reme-
dies essentially are limited to tangible losses: reinstatement, back
pay, lost employment benefits, and attorneys' fees. 4 Such remedies
are meaningful only to employees who actually suffer losses under
quid pro quo harassment. Even then, the advantages of returning to
the prior harassing worksite are questionable. For victims of environ-
mental harassment, injunctions and attorneys' fees are the available
statutory remedies. Compensatory and punitive damages are not
available for either type of harassment.35 Thus, title VII does not
compensate for the physical and emotional harms that arise from the
harassment - harms that often overshadow the actual loss of job
ment. Id. at 213-14.
31. See L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN
ON THE JOB (1978) (cited in Powell, Sexual Harassment: Confronting the Issue of Defi-
nition, BUSINESS HORIZONS 24 (1983)). In a U.S. Office of Personnel Management
study, 42% of female federal employees and 15% of male employees reported being
harassed in the past 24 months. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD. OFFICE OF MERIT
REVIEW AND STUDIES, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A
PROBLEM? 5 (1981).
32. See Sexual Harassment Claims, supra note 10, at 1451.
33. See Theory of Tort Liability, supra note 13, at 1466-67 n.55.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
35. Id.
benefits. Furthermore, since punitive damages are not available, the
deterrent effect of the law is limited. Second, title VII does not apply
to women who work for employers with less than fifteen employees. 36
Finally, the very short statute of limitations for title VII claims
means that many women will attempt to obtain more meaningful
relief in a different forum. 37
Limitations on Imposition of Liability
An unresolved issue is whether the employer can be held liable for
an employee's harassment of another employee absent the employer's
actual knowledge. The consensus of the lower courts, as well as the
EEOC, is that an employer can be held strictly liable for the sexual
harassment of its agents and supervisory employees.38 Most courts
and the EEOC, however, require actual or constructive knowledge
on the part of the employer before an employer may be held liable
for the acts of co-workers and nonemployees.39 Since an employee
can sue only her employer under title VII, such a limitation means
that many women effectively will be without a remedy for environ-
mental harassment injuries other than a remedy in tort. This proce-
dural limitation is compounded by women's particular reluctance to
complain to their employers about this type of harassment.40 The
"complaint requirement" also can be a special problem for employ-
ees who initially participated in, or did not object to, the activities
because they felt it necessary in order to keep their jobs. Not only do
these people face special evidentiary problems in showing the behav-
ior was unwelcome,4' but after the United States Supreme Court de-
36. Id. § 2000e(b) (an "employer" is "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees").
37. Id. § 2000e-5(e). The statute of limitations can be as short as 180 days in
states which do not have agencies enforcing fair employment laws.
38. The definition of a "supervisor" against whom strict liability is imposed is also
an open question. See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985)
(supervisors are those who are delegated the power to make employment decisions); Vin-
son v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1985), reh'g denied en banc, 760 F.2d 1330
(supervisors are those who have even the appearance of a significant degree of influence
in vital job decisions). Even though the issue was raised in Vinson, the Supreme Court
chose not to define "supervisor" in Meritor. See Meritor Says. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S.
Ct. 2399, 2407 (1986) (Justice Marshall, however, in his concurrence, argued for an
expansive reading of "supervisor." Id. at 2409-11).
39. See supra notes 22 & 30.
40. Plaintiff Vinson, for example, did not complain to her employer even though
it had a grievance procedure. The Supreme Court found that failure did not automati-
cally bar her claim, for to file a grievance probably would have been futile. She would
have had to file it with the person who was harassing her. Meritor Says. Bank, 106 S. Ct.
at 2399.
41. See EEOC Decision 84-1 (Nov. 28, 1983), 52 U.S.L.W. 2349 (Dec. 20,
1983). A machine operator told dirty jokes to fit in when she first went to work in a small
engineering firm where the owner also told such jokes; she later stopped. She could not
sue her employer after she stopped because she did not tell her employer she found his
[VOL 25: 125. 1988] Recovery for Sexual Harassment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
cision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,' 2 they face the possibility
of having their past sexual behavior introduced into evidence by the
employer to show the conduct was welcome.4 3
In Meritor, the plaintiff argued that the employer should be held
actions unwelcome. Simply ceasing to participate was not sufficient notice. While mere
acquiescence may not mean that the conduct is welcome, active participation indicates
that the activity is not unwelcome. Such activity raises an affirmative duty to notify later
if it is unwelcome. The Commission found that two other co-workers who did not partici-
pate in using "dirty remarks" and telling "dirty jokes" were sexually harassed. See also
Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 532 (S.D. Miss.
1986) (Plaintiff was unsuccessful in her sexual harassment claim because she was unable
to prove that the conduct was unwelcome. She had failed to tell any of her co-workers
that she found the actions to be embarassing, humiliating, or generally unwelcome.
While initial participation in the conduct did not permanently bar a successful claim,
plaintiff had to be able to identify with some precision a time when she told her co-
workers or supervisors that such conduct would henceforth be considered offensive.).
Although there is some evidence to the contrary, most courts agree that just because
most female workers do not object to the harassing activities, the harasser is not excused
merely by failure to object. Employers and employees are expected to know that harass-
ing behavior is illegal, whether or not most employees tolerate, condone, or even partici-
pate in the activities.
Judges Bork, Scalia, and Starr, in the court of appeals decision in Vinson, vigorously
dissented from the court's holding that plaintiff's capitulation to sexual advances did not
preclude her from bringing a sexual harassment suit. They claimed that the holding pre-
vented a supervisor from introducing evidence that his sexual advances were encouraged
by the employee. Thus, they stated that the ruling means "that sexual dalliance, however
voluntarily engaged in, becomes harassment whenever an employee sees fit, after the
fact, so to characterize it." Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1333. (Bork, J., dissenting). The Su-
preme Court later rejected this argument. See infra note 43.
42. 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
43. Plaintiff Vinson had intercourse with her supervisor 40 or 50 times over a
period of several years, but testified that such activity was "unwelcome"; she only acqui-
esced for fear of losing her job. The district court found that such action was voluntary
and therefore not actionable. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. 37 (D.D.C.
1980). The Supreme Court, partially following the appeals court reasoning, found that
the voluntariness of Vinson's submission was not the issue. Instead, the focus should be
on whether plaintiff indicated that the advances were unwelcome. In making this deter-
mination, the Court held that plaintiff's manner of dress and speech could be considered.
Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2406. The decision leaves open the possibility of introducing the
plaintiff's past sexual behavior to show that the conduct was welcome. The Court did
caution, however, that the relevance of evidence of provocative activity must be weighed
against its potential for prejudice. Id. at 2407.
In Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983), the court held that a worker's
sex life could not be used as evidence. In Priest a waitress sued when her employer fired
her for refusing his demands for sexual favors. The owner claimed she was the sexual
aggressor, and that he fired her for trying to pick up male customers. To support this
argument he sought her detailed sexual history including the name of each sexual part-
ner during the past ten years. A California federal district judge blocked the request
because permitting such disclosures could intimidate, inhibit, or discourage sexual har-
assment claims. Sexual harassment plaintiffs appear to require special protection from
this sort of intimidation and discouragement. The judge noted that rape victims used to
face similar attacks on their moral character. Id. at 757-62.
strictly liable for work-related sexual harassment of its supervisors.
The defendant argued that in a hostile environment case, the em-
ployer should not be held liable unless put on notice of the harass-
ment. The EEOC, in contradiction of its own guidelines, argued for
modifications of both positions.44 The Court left the issue of em-
ployer liability for a future decision and refused to adopt any of
these approaches, noting that Congress must have meant to put some
limits on employer liability for the acts of its employees, but did not
necessarily intend for absence of notice to insulate the employer
from liability." While refusing to spell out guidelines, the Court did
reject per se strict liability for environmental harassment cases, and
implied that absence of notice could be a defense in some cases. 46
The standard may come to be one of agency law, under which deci-
sions would have to be made on a case-by-case basis. However, Jus-
tices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, in concurrence, ar-
gued strongly for strict liability, advocating per se strict liability for
all forms of sexual harassment.'7
The issue of employer knowledge as a prerequisite to liability is
not confined to title VII cases. It presents potential problems in suits
brought under the equal protection clause, as well as in suits involv-
ing other theories discussed below.
EQUAL PROTECTION CAUSES OF ACTION
Sexual harassment suits based on the equal protection clause are
of recent origin. In 1981 the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois first recognized that claims of sex discrimination are cog-
nizable under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.48 Taking note of this fact, and finding that plaintiff's fellow
police officers intentionally treated her differently because of her sex,
the court allowed plaintiff to sue under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act.49 In a later case, another court found that by 1979,
before any court had decided the issue, it was clear that the equal
44. Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2408. The EEOC argued that a supervisor's actions
should be imputed to the employer in the quid pro quo context when a supervisor exer-
cises authority actually delegated to him. In the harassing environment context, the
EEOC argued that when an employer has an express policy against sexual harassment
and procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual harassment claims, and the em-
ployee does not use this procedure, the employer does not have notice, and should not be
held liable. See Nelson, DOJ Brief Departs From Guidelines on Harassment, Legal
Times, Jan. 27, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
45. Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2408.
46. Id. at 2408-09.
47. Id. at 2409-11.
48. Woerner v. Brzeczek, 519 F. Supp. 517, 519-20 (N.D. I11. 1981).
49. Id. at 519-20. The court found that the sexual advances would not have been
made to the plaintiff had she been a male. She was allowed to sue her superiors who
engaged in acts entirely unrelated to a legitimate government objective.
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protection clause protected people from sexual harassment.5 0
Since sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination,5 ' and sex
discrimination has been cognizable under the equal protection clause
since the Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Reed52 in 1971, it is not
surprising that the courts have recognized such suits. What is sur-
prising is that there has been little litigation of sexual harassment
claims under this theory. Discrimination claims are more limited
under the Constitution than under title VII because only acts of in-
tentional discrimination are cognizable under the Constitution; how-
ever, this should not affect sexual harassment claims. By definition,
actions that would constitute sexual harassment are intentionally
discriminatory.
One possible problem in this regard, however, is whether an em-
ployer can be held liable for a sexually harassing environment of
which the employer had no knowledge. As noted above, the courts in
title VII cases are split regarding vicarious liability without knowl-
edge of a harassing environment, but the majority opinion is that
liability should not ensue. It is even less likely that liability without
knowledge would be assessed under the equal protection clause be-
cause the plaintiff would have difficulty showing the requisite intent
without knowledge.
Judge Posner, in a concurrence in Bohen v. City of East Chi-
cago,53 took such a limited interpretation. In Bohen, a fired employee
of the City of East Chicago Fire Department sued on the basis of
sexual harassment and sex and national origin discrimination under
50. Estate of Scott v. de Leon, 603 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mich. 1985). This
ruling allowed suit by the estate of a woman who committed suicide at least in part due
to sexual harassment. The court found that the equal protection clause forbids inten-
tional discrimination against a woman because of her sex by a person acting under color
of state law. It found that common sense as well as case law under title VII indicated
that sexual harassment was the sort of invidious discrimination which was forbidden. Id.
at 1332.
51. "Creating abusive conditions for female employees and not for males is dis-
crimination .... Forcing women and not men to work in an environment of sexual
harassment is no different than forcing women to work in a dirtier or more hazardous
environment than men." Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir.
1986). The court cited Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1979), for holding that
the equal protection clause contains a "federal constitutional right to be free from gender
discrimination" that does not "serve important governmental objectives" and is not "sub-
stantially related to those objectives." Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1185. The court further noted
that all district courts except the court it was reviewing, when faced with the issue, had
held that sexual harassment by a state employer was sex discrimination violative of the
equal protection clause and actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
52. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
53. 799 F.2d 1180, 1189-92 (7th Cir. 1986).
both title VII and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Judge Posner noted that Bohen could successfully sue
the city under the equal protection clause because the city knew of
the harassment and did nothing. He characterized the employee's
claim as a claim for failure to protect against harassment, not of
sexual harassment, because she was not suing the employees who
harassed her.54
Interpretations by other courts in a slightly different context show
a similar reluctance to read the law expansively to allow such suits.
In Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social Services,55 for
example, the court restrictively interpreted plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion.56 Huebschen, one of the first suits brought by a man for sexual
harassment, was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. David E. Hueb-
schen was demoted after rejecting the sexual advances of Jacqueline
Radner, an assistant director in the Wisconsin Bureau of Social Se-
curity Disability Insurance.51 The jury awarded him $114,600 in
damages against Radner, plus $81,900 against Radner's superior
who approved the demotion, and $8,000 in back pay. On appeal the
Seventh Circuit disallowed the claim, finding that Radner was not
an "employer" and that title VII allowed suit only against employ-
ers.58 Thus, the court found that no legal basis existed for a section
1983 suit based on title VII when Huebschen could not directly sue
Radner under title VII.59 This opinion concurred with earlier deci-
sions of the Second and Fifth Circuits, which found that enforcing
title VII through section 1983 gives plaintiffs no greater substantive
rights than they would have if they had proceeded directly under
title VII.60
Since employees cannot sue their co-employees under the equal
protection clause, and will be unlikely to be able to sue their em-
ployer unless the employer had knowledge of the harassing environ-
ment, victims of a sexually harassing environment are unlikely to be
successful under this theory.
While substantive rights cannot be greater under a constitutional
claim than under title VII, damages may be. In Bohen v. City of
East Chicago, the plaintiff lost on all counts in the district court. 1
On appeal, the district court opinion was reversed in part, the court
of appeals finding that sexual harassment is compensable as a viola-
54. Id. at 1189.
55. 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983).
56. See id. at 1170-72.
57. Id. at 1169.
58. Id. at 1170.
59. Id. at 1170-71.
60. See $25,000 sex harassment award to male worker is overturned, 70 A.B.A.
J., Jan. 1984, at 131, col. 2.
61. See 622 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
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tion of the equal protection clause, and the case was remanded for
determination of damages. The court found plaintiff's claim compen-
sable even though she did not lose her job as a result of the sexual
harassment.62 Plaintiffs suing under sections 1981 and 1983 gener-
ally can get greater damages than would be available under title
VII. They can also avoid some of the complex procedural require-
ments and time limitations involved in a title VII action. Thus, there
are incentives for plaintiffs to bring sexual harassment claims under
these sections. Similar advantages also prompt plaintiffs to sue in
tort.
NONSTATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION
Traditional Tort Causes of Action
Traditional tort causes of action provided the only avenue of legal
redress for the victims of sexual harassment before title VII was in-
terpreted to ban this type of discrimination. Various tort causes of
action remain attractive to plaintiffs, despite their opportunity to
proceed under title VII. When the facts of a case fulfill the elements
of one of the intentional torts, the plaintiff can obtain a far more
lucrative remedy than is possible under title VII. In contrast to the
equitable remedies available to the successful plaintiff under title
VII,63 the successful tort plaintiff may recover compensatory dam-
ages that include damages for pain and suffering or emotional dis-
tress and, in appropriate cases, punitive damages.64 Other substantial
advantages of tort actions over title VII actions include longer stat-
utes of limitations, less complex (or at least, more familiar) proce-
dures, and the availability of jury trial."
62. 799 F.2d at 1182.
63. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text for discussion of remedies
available under title VII.
64. See Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 534 (1981)(plaintiff's allegations, if proven, could entitle her to punitive damages). See also, e.g.,
Clark v. World Airways, 24 Fed. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305 (D.D.C. 1980) (plaintiff
recovered $52,000 in sexual harassment case involving off-color remarks, offensive touch-
ing and explicit sexual advances); Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 77 Or. App. 663,
714 P.2d 618 (1986) (plaintiff awarded $65,000 in general damages, $75,000 in punitive
damages against one defendant and $25,000 in punitive damages against another); Ser-
itis v. Lane, 30 Fed. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980) (plaintiff
awarded $50,000 in damages for infliction of emotional distress and $150,000 in punitive
damages).
65. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 739-40
(2d ed. 1983). In fact, one of the few economic advantages of title VII over a tort action
is that the successful plaintiffs attorney's fees will be reimbursed under title VII. Id. at
528-29, 1466-1511. In a tort cause of action, the "American rule," which requires each
This bounty does not await every victim of sexual harassment,
however. Sexual harassment is not yet cognizable as an independent
tort.66 The likelihood of compensation depends on the plaintiff's abil-
ity to prove all of the elements of an existing cause of action that
may not be well suited to the types of interests and injuries involved
in a sexual harassment suit. In this sense, traditional tort law is a
narrow avenue of redress.
An additional potential problem is whether liability can be im-
posed on the employer for an intentional tort committed by its em-
ployee. Because an employee is likely to be victimized by a supervi-
sory employee rather than the employer, and the supervisory
employee may not be able to respond in damages, a victory in court
could be hollow unless the plaintiff can succeed in establishing liabil-
ity on the part of the employer. This may be accomplished by prov-
ing that the employer had knowledge of the harmful situation, but
did not act to remedy it,61 by establishing that the supervisory em-
ployee had been placed in a position in which he had a peculiar op-
portunity and incentive to commit the tort, or that the employee's
conduct was foreseeable as being within the range of responsibilities
entrusted to him by the employer."8
Yet a further problem concerns whether a tort claim arising from
sexual harassment in employment is foreclosed by the exclusivity
provisions of workers' compensation statutes. Although very few
courts have considered this question, it appears that tort actions aris-
ing from sexual harassment are not likely to be governed by the ex-
clusivity provision of workers' compensation statutes.69
litigant to bear his own transactional costs, would apply. See Mallor, Punitive Attorneys'
Fees for Abuses of the Judicial $ystem, 61 N.C.L. REv. 613, 615-19 (1983).
66. See generally Theory of Tort Liability, supra note 13 (proposing the develop-
ment of an independent tort of sexual harassment in the employment context).
67. See Robson v. Eva's Super Market, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ohio 1982);
Rogers, 526 F. Supp. at 526-27; Lewis, 77 Or. App. 663, 714 P.2d 618 (1986).
68. See Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 987 (D.C. 1984); Meyer v. Graphic
Arts Int'l Union, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 178, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597, 599 (1979). But see
McCalla v. Ellis, 341 N.W.2d 525, 528-29 (Mich. App. 1983) (no vicarious liability on
the part of employer, because employer liable only for acts committed within scope of
employment). For further discussion, see Legal Remedies, supra note 13, at 173-75.
69. See, e.g., Meyer, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597 (exclusivity rule
does not apply when injury was intentional); McCalla, 341 N.W.2d 525 (sex discrimina-
tion claim not within purview of workers' compensation act).
Another threshold issue for potential plaintiffs in the military is whether a woman in
the service who is sexually assaulted may sue the Army. In 1984, the Army won two
cases on the ground that the injuries were not "incident to service." Suit was dismissed in
Stubbs v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Ark. 1984), af/d, 744 F.2d 58 (8th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985), a suit brought by the sister of a woman
who committed suicide after allegedly being assaulted by her sergeant. Stubbs, a private
in basic training, was ordered to last minute latrine duty where she was fondled by her
sergeant and told that her discipline would be much worse if she refused his advances. In
a previous suit brought by a woman who was gang-raped in an Army barracks, the
Army's claims service ruled that her suit for damages was barred by the Feres doctrine,
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Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Almost all states now permit recovery of damages for extreme
misconduct that results in severe emotional distress.70 The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts states that a person is subject to liability for
resulting emotional or physical harm if he "by extreme and outra-
geous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional dis-
tress to another. 17 1 The crucial elements that must be established
are that the defendant behaved in an extreme and outrageous way
toward the plaintiff and that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional
distress as a result.
Because this cause of action may provide a remedy for the intangi-
ble harm that can result from sexual harassment, it is one of the
more promising tort causes of action. The chief threat to the mainte-
nance of a claim premised on infliction of emotional distress is that
the extreme and outrageous conduct element is a matter of personal
judgment that requires some sensitivity on the part of the factfinder
to the nature of sexual harassment. According to the Restatement,
the standard for the outrage requirement is that the actor's conduct
should be of such a nature that it would arouse the resentment of an
average member of the community and lead him to exclaim, "Outra-
geous!" 72 The traditional rule was that it was not extreme and outra-
geous to solicit sexual favors, because "there is no harm in asking." '
Even in the more traditional cases, however, hounding the object of
one's attentions could fulfill the outrage requirement. 4
Recent sexual harassment cases that have reached the appellate
which bars claims by service members whose injuries "arise out of - are in the course of
activity incident to service." (See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); see
also Lauter, Sexual Assault Again Held 'Incident to Service', Nat'l L.J., Apr. 2, 1984,
at 8, col. 1.) The case then was filed in district court. Buckmiller v. United States, C84-
0205TEH (N.D. Cal. 1984) (unreported). Similarly, the Stubbs court held that the
Eighth Circuit had broadly interpreted Feres' "incident to service" to include someone
who, at the time of the action, was "subject to military discipline." 744 F.2d at 60. Other
courts of appeals, such as the Ninth Circuit, have interpreted Feres more liberally, and
require a "relevant relationship" between the service member's action and the military
interests that might be jeopardized by a civil suit. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States,
704 F.2d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1983).
70. See Legal Remedies, supra note 13, at 171 nn. 103-04. See, e.g., Rogers, 526
F. Supp. at 530.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
72. Id. comment d (1977).
73. See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1055 (1936). See, e.g., Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079
(1903).
74. See, e.g., Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
courts on motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment have
shown much greater sensitivity to harassment. In Rogers v. Loews
L'Enfant Plaza Hotel,5 the plaintiff, an assistant manager of a hotel
restaurant, alleged that her supervisor made written and verbal sex-
ual advances to her, pressing notes into her hand while she was busy
at work, leaving them in menus that she was distributing to restau-
rant patrons, and leaving them in her purse without her knowledge."6
Although the plaintiff rebuffed these overtures, her supervisor
touched her, pulled at her hair, and made continuous advances and
sarcastic, leering comments about her personal and sexual life. 77
Later, the supervisor began to retaliate against the plaintiff by ex-
cluding her from staff meetings, refusing to cooperate with her, and
belittling her in front of the staff."8 After unsuccessfully seeking re-
dress from her employer, the plaintiff filed suit based on title VII
and several tort theories.7 9 The court found that the plaintiff's com-
plaint alleged facts and circumstances that exceeded mere insults,
indignities, and petty oppression." If proved, stated the court, de-
fendant's conduct would be construed as outrageous."'
Other intentional infliction of emotional distress cases arising out
of sexual harassment in employment have emphasized the outra-
geous nature of the abuse of power by an employer or supervisory
employee.82 In a society that increasingly abhors the abuse of power
and expresses that abhorrence through a variety of legal principles
aimed at curbing such abuses, it is not surprising that courts would
be willing to venture that a jury might cry "Outrageous!" at the type
of conduct alleged by Ms. Rogers and other similarly situated
employees.
75. 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981).
76. Id. at 525.
77. Id. at 526.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 527.
80. Id. at 531.
81. Id. See also Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1982). Cf. Hooten
v. Pennsylvania College of Optometry, 601 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (plaintiff com-
plained of a pattern of harassment and hostility based on her gender, but not sexual
harassment; court held that the defendants' acts may have been oppressive, but they did
not rise (or fall) to the level of extreme outrage that was represented in cases of sexual
harassment. Id. at 1154-55.).
82. See, e.g., Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1206 (8th Cir. 1984);
Shaffer v. Nat'l Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909, 915 (E.D. Pa. 1983). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment e (1965): "The extreme and outrageous character of
the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the
other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his
interests."
In a utility-consumer context, see Macey v. New York State Elec. and Gas Corp., 80
A.D. 2d 669, 436 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1981).
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Assault and Battery
When an employee has been touched and physically threatened
with unwelcome contact, she may have an action for battery, assault,
or both.83
Assault occurs when a person, acting with intention to cause
harmful or offensive contact, causes another to experience imminent
apprehension of such contact.84 Battery, on the other hand, occurs
when the defendant actually brings about the harmful or offensive
contact while acting with intent to cause either battery or assault.85
Physical behavior that accompanies some harassment, such as the
hair pulling that was alleged in the Rogers case, unwelcome ca-
resses,86 grabbing, 7 and even rape,88 fits within the elements of bat-
tery. Nonverbal conduct (alone or in combination with verbal con-
duct) that threatens offensive sexual conduct can constitute assault,
even if no contact actually occurs.
Words alone, however, are insufficient for both assault and bat-
tery.89 Thus, a pattern of sexual harassment can be extremely harm-
ful to nonphysical interests of the plaintiff, yet may not be actionable
as an assault or battery if the harassment has not involved physical
contact or the threat of imminent physical contact.
Invasion of Privacy (Intrusion Upon Solitude)
The tort of invasion of privacy includes a number of distinct theo-
ries, among them intrusion upon solitude. The Restatement describes
intrusion as the intentional intrusion, "physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns
• ..if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son. '90 Although this language is quite broad, many courts have lim-
ited intrusion to conduct akin to a trespass into private areas from
which one should be excluded, 9' although the trend appears to be
83. See, e.g., Meyer v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 597 (1979) (plaintiff alleged being beaten, confined, and raped by fellow employees
during business hours).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1977).
85. Id. § 13.
86. See, e.g., Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1982).
87. See, e.g., Robson v. Eva's Super Market, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ohio
1982).
88. See, e.g., Meyer, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 31 (1977).
90. Id. § 652B (emphasis added).
91. See Theory of Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 1478.
moving away from this position. 2
Several recent decisions involving sexual harassment indicate,
however, that if the Restatement formulation of intrusion is used,
intrusion may be an apt cause of action for many victims of sexual
harassment. Persistent and unwelcome telephone calls have been
held to be an invasion of privacy, at least in cases involving debt
collection. 3 In Rogers, the court held that the plaintiff had stated a
claim for invasion of privacy by alleging that her supervisor had re-
peatedly called her at home and at work and made leering comments
about her personal and sexual life to her.94
In Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc.,95 the Supreme
Court of Alabama, on a certification from the Eleventh Circuit, ap-
plied the intrusion theory of invasion of privacy broadly so as to
cover many patterns of sexual harassment. In Phillips, the principal
owner of the business that employed the plaintiff as an "overhead
cleaner" repeatedly called the plaintiff into his office and, after lock-
ing the door, questioned her in detail about her personal and sexual
life and demanded that she perform sexual acts with him.9 The
court held that it was not necessary that the defendant invade some
physically defined space or area as opposed to one's personality or
psychological integrity.97 Rather, the defendant's examination of the
plaintiff's private concerns and his intrusion and coercive sexual de-
mands constituted a wrongful intrusion that would be actionable no
matter where they occurred. The court had little trouble concluding
that this intrusion was offensive, noting that the defendant, who was
aware that the plaintiff was dependent on her income, rendered the
plaintiff an "economic prisoner."98 The court further noted that
under the relaxed standard for proximate cause applied to inten-
tional torts, the defendant was responsible to the plaintiff for the
treatment of the severe emotional problems that were proximately
caused by his intrusion.99
One common element of sexual harassment cases appears to be
the harasser's intrusive demands and questioning of the victim. Fun-
damentally, all quid pro quo sexual harassment is an intrusion into
privacy. Through a pattern of sexual harassment, the person who
possesses power over the employment relationship seeks to intrude
92. See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
947 (1969).
93. See, e.g., Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25
(1932). See also Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
94. 526 F. Supp. at 528.
95. 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983).
96. Id. at 707.
97. Id. at 711.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 712.
[VOL. 25: 125, 1988] Recovery for Sexual Harassment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
upon the victim and interfere with what is a very private decision on
the victim's part: the decision when, where, and with whom he or she
will have a personal rather than a business relationship. If other
courts demonstrate the willingness to apply the intrusion theory so
liberally, intrusion could become the dominant tort cause of action
for redressing sexual harassment.100
Intentional Interference with Contract
When sexual harassment by a third party (such as a fellow em-
ployee or supervisor) threatens a plaintiff's employment, the em-
ployee may be able to obtain compensation for intentional interfer-
ence with his or her employment contract. 1'0 Success under this
cause of action requires a showing that the plaintiff had a contrac-
tual relationship and that the defendant maliciously and without jus-
tification procured the plaintiff's discharge. 02
Although this cause of action has been successfully used in sexual
harassment cases, 03 several sticking points prevent it from being
widely applicable in such cases. First, the majority view is that it
100. A related issue that has been raised is whether a plaintiff who claims sexual
harassment can demand that her identity be protected, and successfully sue if her iden-
tity is revealed. In Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
the New York district court held that widespread and somewhat sensational coverage of
a sexual harassment suit brought by a former employee against the bank and a former
bank official was not sufficient "good cause" under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule 26(c), to warrant a broad protective order prohibiting dissemination of information
obtained during discovery even though defendant's reputation might be injured. Id. at
480-81. While the court would not issue the order at that point in the lawsuit, it did note
that some material gained through discovery might later be appropriate for a narrowly
drawn protective order. Id. at 482.
The court protected the victim's privacy in Jennings v. D.H.L. Airlines, 101 F.R.D.
549 (N.D. Ill. 1984), when the airline sought to gain discovery of her files from her
psychologist. Jennings was fired after a physical fight with a co-worker, and later sued
her employer, alleging it allowed male workers to harass her and interfere with her work.
Her employer had earlier told her to see a psychologist, which she had done. The psy-
chologist told a manager that Jennings had a "socialization problem," and the company
sought discovery of the psychiatrist's files to disprove her claim. Id. at 550. The court
found that the company could get the information it needed from its personnel records
and Jenning's co-workers. Id. at 551.
101. See generally W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION:
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 194-96 (1985).
102. Id. at 194.
103. See, e.g., Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 521, 527 (D.N.J.
1981) (employee stated claim against individual defendants for tortious interference);
Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978) (supervisor and co-work-
ers maliciously interfered with plaintiff's employment contract); Tash v. Houston, 74
Mich. App. 566, 254 N.W.2d 579 (1977) (employee discharged when she spurned sexual
advances of supervisor stated cause of action for tortious interference with employment).
does not apply to the discharge of employees at will.10 4 Second, this
theory does not permit liability on the part of the employer because
the essence of the wrong is that a third person interferes with the
employer-employee relationship.10 5 Third, it requires proof of eco-
nomic harm and does not redress psychic harms. 106
Tort and Contract Actions for Wrongful Discharge
An employee who is actually or constructively discharged from
employment as a result of sexual harassment may have a cause of
action under a tort or contract theory of wrongful discharge. Wrong-
ful discharge theories that protect employees at will emerged, for the
most part, within the past decade. 10 7 They include breach of implied
contract, public policy tort, and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. No single theory is accepted by every
state, although a number of states recognize two or more theories.1 "8
Any of these theories might be implicated by a discharge that
flows from a pattern of sexual harassment. The plaintiff might have
an express or implied contract for continued employment, in which
case discharge in retaliation for her refusal to capitulate to sexual
harassment would be a breach of contract. 10 This could be true even
when the source of the employee's right to job security is found in
employee literature or handbook rather than in an express
contract.110
Even without express or implied promises of continued employ-
ment, discharge resulting from sexual harassment could be actiona-
ble under the two more open-ended causes of action. Under the pub-
lic policy theory, the employer commits a tort if he discharges an
employee for a reason that violates an independent public policy. 1
As a condition of recovery under this cause of action, courts demand
that a plaintiff demonstrate some precise public policy, preferably a
relatively specific one contained in a statute,112 that was violated by
104. See W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 101, at 195. But see Tash v.
Houston, 74 Mich. App. 566, 254 N.W.2d 579 (1977).
105. See Theory of Tort Liability, supra note 13, at 1480.
106. Id.
107. For further discussion of the development of wrongful discharge, see generally
Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Friedman, Exposed Nerves: Some
Thoughts About Our Changing Legal Culture, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 529, 544 (1983);
Peirce, Mann & Roberts, Employee Termination At Will: A Principled Approach, 28
VILL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
108. See table of jurisdictions indicating theories of recovery recognized in Em-
ployment Coordinator (RIA) EP-22, 681 n.3 (1984).
109. See, e.g., Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1984).
110. See generally Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-at-Will Con-
tracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196.
111. See, e.g., Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984).
112. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505
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the discharge.
In a sexual harassment case, the plaintiff would be able to point to
title VII or a state fair employment practices act as concrete evi-
dence of the public policy against sexual harassment and sex dis-
crimination. In Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc.,113 however, the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit premised the plaintiff's public pol-
icy tort claim on the public policy manifested by the statute
criminalizing prostitution.114 It stated that a "woman invited to trade
herself for a job is in effect being asked to become a prostitute," and
that the plaintiff should not be penalized for refusing to do what the
law forbids." 5 As the Lucas case indicates, a sexual harassment
plaintiff may be able to point to public policy expressed in a number
of sources that would be violated by her discharge. She may be able
to identify criminal statutes that forbid adultery, fornication, or non-
consensual sexual activity, for example, or public policies demon-
strated in constitutional provisions, statutes, or case law that protect
the sanctity of marriage. She also may premise her case on the argu-
ment that she was discharged for exercising a legal right: that of
resisting unwelcome sexual advances." 6 In short, a victim of sexual
harassment should not have any difficulty persuading a court that a
public policy was violated by harassment that has culminated in her
discharge.
Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
another cause of action that also could apply in cases of discrimina-
tory discharge arising from sexual harassment. Under this theory, an
extracontractual duty is imposed on an employer to deal with the
employee in good faith."' The employer who discharges an employee
in bad faith, frustrating her reasonable expectations, can be held lia-
ble for damages." 8 Courts have found bad faith in cases in which
the employer discharged the employee for an ulterior motive not re-
(1980); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
113. 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 1205.
115. Id.
116. See Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (Or. 1984)
(en banc).
117. See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977); Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
118. In some states, the cause of action lies in tort, complete with the possibility of
punitive damages. See, e.g., Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d
213 (1983). In others, it is a contract cause of action, with damages limited to traditional
contract remedies. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549
(1974).
lated to the employee's job performance.11
One of the earliest cases permitting a discharged employee to re-
cover damages because of a bad faith discharge was a sexual harass-
ment case, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company.20 In Monge, a press
machine operator refused to date her foreman and was discharged
for her resistance. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
noted that the employer's right to run his business as he sees fit must
be balanced against the public interest in maintaining employ-
ment. '2 Discharges that are motivated by bad faith, malice, or retal-
iation constitute a breach of contract.'22 Lucas, as well, was pre-
mised partially on breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. The court there stated that "it is an implied term of
every contract of employment that neither party be required to do
what the law forbids."' 23
Unfortunately, relatively few jurisdictions have been willing to ap-
ply the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employ-
ment contracts. 24 In a jurisdiction that does recognize this theory,
however, a discharge arising from sexual harassment would provide
ample grounds for recovery. 125
119. See, e.g., MeKinney v. Nat'l Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass.
1980) (employee discharged because of his age); Mitford v. Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000
(Alaska 1983) (employee discharged to avoid paying him commission to which he was
entitled); Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (employee discharged for
filing lawsuit against employer).
120. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
121. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
122. Id.
123. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1205.
124. See Mallor, supra note 65, at 467.
125. Another issue surrounding wrongful discharge arising from sexual harassment
is whether it is wrongful to discharge or discipline the alleged perpetrator. Is allowing
sexual harassment in the classroom "immoral conduct" sufficient to support dismissal of
the teacher? In Ross v. Robb, 662" S.W.2d 257 (Mo. 1983), the Missouri Supreme Court
found that a vocational teacher could be fired who allowed and encouraged male mem-
bers of his class to sexually harass the only female member, failed to discipline the class,
and engaged in such behavior himself. It upheld the finding of the school board that he
was unfit to teach. Id. at 260. In another case, a "bartender leader" at an officer's club
challenged his dismissal for sexually harassing female subordinates because they had not
taken their complaints to an EEOC counselor first. The court upheld the Air Force'9
right to apply a regulation that authorized dismissal for a deliberate second offense of sex
discrimination, and recommending dismissal for a third offense. Hostetter v. United
States, 739 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984).
In French v. Mead Paper Corporation, No. 83-3745 (S.D. Ohio), aJd, 758 F.2d 652
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 68 (1985), the court concluded that a male supervi-
sory employee who was fired for sexually harassing female employees did not state a
claim for gender-based discrimination under title VII. The questions presented in the
petition for certiorari were: (1) Does a male employee have the same protections under
title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act as a female employee in a case involving alleged sexual
harassment? (2) Does mere allegation by a female employee constitute a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason under title VII to insulate her employer against liability in a sex
discrimination case? In another case, three male supervisors fired for sexual harassment
were unsuccessful in suits based on abusive discharge, intentional infliction of emotional
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DOES TITLE VII PREEMPT TRADITIONAL TORT OR WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE ACTIONS?
A victim of sexual harassment who attempts to file a state tort or
contract action in addition to or instead of a title VII action may be
confronted with an argument that title VII should foreclose her state
actions that arise from the same set of facts. The defendant might
distress, and breach of the employment contract. Johnson v. Int'l Minerals & Chem.
Corp., 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1651 (S.D.S.D. 1986). The employees were
accused of participating in the harassment of two women who were under their supervi-
sion. The women were among the first women hired at the plant, and there were very few
women in the facility. They were subjected to, among other things, pinching and bruising
of their breasts, forcible attempts to kiss and fondle them, lewd remarks, and "snuggies."
(This involved a maneuver whereby one grabs another person's underpants and jerks the
underpants up). Id. at 1652. After enduring the harassment for some time, they filed a
complaint with the Wyoming Fair Employment Commission and the EEOC. They ulti-
mately settled their claim with the employer (IMC). Subsequent to the settlement, IMC
conducted its own investigation, and concluded that the three supervisors were guilty of
the harassment and discrimination charges. The supervisors were fired. Other employees
who had also been accused were not fired after the investigation. The court found that
the supervisors were employees at will, and recognized that many jurisdictions had
carved out public policy exceptions to this doctrine. However, there were no such public
policy exceptions applicable to this case. Likewise, even if an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing were to be recognized, it was not breached in this case, for IMC
acted in good faith by conducting a thorough investigation prior to making the decision
to discharge the plaintiffs. The court found that there was no express or implied contract
to be breached. On the defamation allegation, the court found that there was no support
except the conclusory statements of the plaintiffs, and in any event, truth was a defense.
Defendants were not liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress because they
did nothing outrageous. Indeed, they acted reasonably in all respects. The court ordered
further briefs on the issue of attorney's fees for IMC, and on IMC's claim for contribu-
tion and indemnity for the amount it had to pay the two women in settlement of their
claim.
In Downes v. Federal Aviation Administration, 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the
plaintiff, a federal aviation inspector, was accused of both quid pro quo and environmen-
tal sexual harassment, and was demoted. The demotion was upheld by the Merit Systems
Protection Board. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the
demotion because sexual harassment had not been adequately proved. The evidence sup-
porting the quid pro quo harassment was a statement of a female employee that "Fin
[Downes] has asked me if I have ever thought about trading favors to get ahead in the
agency. He's also said, 'Boy, if I had a body like yours, I'd really go places.'" The court
found there was no request for sexual favors or retaliation for denial in this statement,
and therefore no quid pro quo sexual harassment. Id. at 292. The court further found
that plaintiff had not created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment be-
cause his actions had not been sufficiently pervasive or offensive. There had only been five
incidents over three years, and some of those were "trivial," such as his reference to one
employee as "the Dolly Parton of the office." These did not interfere with any employee's
psychological well being, and all but one female employee signed a petition supporting
him as a manager. Id. at 295. The latter reasoning is somewhat in conflict with Priest v.
Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986), in which a waitress stated a title VII claim
against her employer for sexual harassment even though some of her co-workers toler-
ated and did not object to being sexually harassed by the employer.
assert that the complex procedural mechanism for obtaining com-
pensation under title VII and its limited remedies reflect a deliberate
policy choice made by Congress about the proper way in which to
redress sex discrimination, and that the legislative will would be
thwarted by state tort and contract remedies that permit a plaintiff
to bypass the procedural and remedial limitations of the statute."2 6
The defendant might also argue that the public policy against sexual
harassment, as a species of sex discrimination, is already vindicated
by title VII, rendering state tort and contract theories arising from
the same facts duplicative. 12 7 Finally, the defendant might argue
that the more general action is foreclosed by the availability of a
specific action designed to redress sex discrimination. 128
The language and history of title VII indicate that Congress did
not intend it to foreclose state remedies. The statute specifically
states that it does not "exempt or relieve any person from any liabil-
ity, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future
law of any State or political subdivision of a State.' 1 29 The Supreme
Court repeatedly has emphasized the supplementary nature of title
VII. 30
Nevertheless, in cases involving discharge as a result of a general
type of sex, race, or age discrimination, the majority of courts that
have considered the issue have held that wrongful discharge actions
based on the public policy contained in the remedial statute (title
VII or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act) are foreclosed
by the existence of the remedial statute.3 ' Of great importance in
these cases is the fact that the courts perceive the interest violated in
cases of discriminatory discharge to be identical with the interest
addressed and remedied by title VII. This is demonstrated by the
fact that a number of courts have permitted a plaintiff to maintain
an implied contract cause of action' 32 or a traditional tort cause of
action, while denying the plaintiff's right to maintain a wrongful dis-
charge action.'3 3
126. See, e.g., Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27, 29 (1984).
127. See, e.g., Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 295, 299 (D. Me.
1985).
128. See the argument made by the defendant in Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp.
891, 894-95 (D.D.C. 1982).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.
130. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975); Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974).
131. See Mallor, Discriminatory Discharge and the Emerging Common Law of
Wrongful Discharge, 28 ARIZ. L. REv. 651, 665-68 (1986).
132. See, e.g., Cory v. SmithKline Beckman Corp., 585 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Pa.
1984). See also Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 574 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va.
1983) (employee maintained both title VII action and implied contract action).
133. See, e.g., Cory, 585 F. Supp. at 875; Shaffer v. Nat'l Can Corp., 565 F. Supp.
909 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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Although most courts have rejected the availability of wrongful
discharge actions, a sizable body of case law remains in which dis-
criminatorily discharged employees have been permitted to maintain
such actions. 34 Perhaps it is significant that several of these cases
have involved plaintiffs who were the victims of sexual harass-
ment."35 In both the Lucas case and Holien v. Sears, Roebuck &
Company, 3' the courts struggled to distance the plaintiffs wrongful
discharge actions from the public policy against sex discrimination
found in title VII. The Lucas court based its opinion on the public
policy against prostitution,"3 7 while the Holien court viewed the
plaintiff's discharge as a retaliation against her for exercising a legal
right.138 More to the point, the court in Holien commented that:
Title VII fail[s] to capture the personal nature of the injury done to a
wrongfully discharged employe as an individual and the remedies provided
by the statutes fail to appreciate the relevant dimensions of the problem.
Reinstatement, back pay, and injunctions vindicate the rights of the victim-
ized group without compensating the plaintiff for such personal injuries as
anguish, physical symptoms of stress, a sense of degradation, and the cost of
psychiatric care. Legal remedies as well as equitable remedies are needed to
make the plaintiff whole.13
Even if title VII does not foreclose a wrongful discharge action,
exclusivity provisions in state fair employment legislation might do
so.140 For example, in two recent sexual harassment cases, Wolk v.
Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc."4 and Shaffer v. National Can Corpora-
tion, 42  language of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(PHRA)4 3 was interpreted to supplant the plaintiffs' claims based
134. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d
1292 (1984). See discussion of existing case law in Mallor, supra note 131, at 510-15.
135. See Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984); Holien,
298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292. But see Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d
Cir. 1984); Shaffer, 565 F. Supp. 909.
136. 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984).
137. See Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1205.
138. Holien, 298 Or. at 76, 689 P.2d at 1292.
139. Id. at 99, 689 P.2d at 1303.
140. Most states have antidiscrimination statutes, some of which are considered
broader than title VII. Minnesota's Human Rights Act, for example, was interpreted in
Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota to require an employer to curb sexual harassment
among co-workers before a similar ruling had been made under title VII. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 363.03 (West 1966 & Supp. 1987).
Only six of the state fair employment practices acts include exclusivity provisions.
Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMPLE L.Q.
65, 83 n.120 (1985).
141. 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
142. 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b)(Purdon Supp. 1982) provides in part that:
on the public policy theory of wrongful discharge.'
Plaintiffs have fared much better under traditional tort causes of
action than under wrongful discharge actions. In Shaffer, for exam-
ple, the court held that Ms. Shaffer's wrongful discharge claim was
foreclosed, but permitted her to maintain a claim for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.' 45 The court based its decision on the
fact that "the interests sought to be protected by the PHRA and this
tort are fundamentally different. 1 46 Whereas the statute effectuates
the state's interests in eradicating targeted forms of discrimination,
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress vindicates the
personal interest of freedom from intentionally imposed mental
anguish. Because the interests protected are so different, the court
concluded that the legislature could not have intended the statute to
supplant the tort cause of action.14
Similarly, in Stewart v. Thomas,148 the court held that plaintiff's
assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress alle-
gations were not subsumed by title VII because they were based on
different interests.149 The court, however, stated that any emotional
injuries that resulted from her stressful work situation would be fore-
closed as having been remedied by title VII, but any emotional inju-
ries that were a direct result of the defendant's assaultive behavior
could be compensated through her tort claim. 50 This approach of
apportioning a single human being's emotional damage between two
closely related traumas may be unworkable, but it at least opens the
door for the plaintiff to prove her case.
Outside of a jurisdiction in which a state employment discrimina-
tion statute has been interpreted expressly or impliedly to exclude
any parallel common law action arising from the same facts, two
strategies appear to be workable for plaintiffs. One is to premise a
claim on some interest or public policy distinct from the public pol-
icy against sex discrimination. The other, which is related, is to dis-
tinguish sexual harassment from more generalized forms of sex dis-
crimination. For example,. the plaintiff could assert that the
equitable remedies of title VII and most state fair employment prac-
tices acts vindicate only the public and individual interests of guar-
"as to acts declared unlawful by section five of this act the procedure herein provided
shall, when invoked, be exclusive and the final determination therein shall exclude any
action, civil or criminal, based on the same grievance of the complainant concerned."
In Wolk, this statute was held to bar a public policy tort action even though the plain-
tiff had not invoked the statutory remedy. See 728 F.2d at 224.
144. Wolk, 728 F.2d at 224; Shaffer, 565 F. Supp. at 913.
145. 565 F. Supp. at 914.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 538 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1982).
149. Id. at 896-97.
150. Id.
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anteeing equality of opportunity in the workplace. These interests,
however, are only a fraction of the interests offended by sexual har-
assment. Sexual harassment involves the violation of individual dig-
nitary interests (interests that may or may not fit within the rubric
of a traditional tort cause of action) and the public interest in con-
trolling the abuse of power. The argument that sexual harassment is
different from other forms of discrimination has merit and should be
received favorably by courts.
CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER RICO
Another theory of recovery currently being explored by workers
subjected to sexual harassment is the private civil action under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)."'
Employees victimized by sexual harassment have begun to accuse
their employers, co-workers, and union officials of "racketeering ac-
tivity." Their motives for doing so are easy to discern, for the statute
offers a federal forum, mandatory treble damages, and attorneys'
fees to successful plaintiffs.152 Both cases in which plaintiffs have in-
cluded RICO counts in conjunction with title VII and Civil Rights
Act claims for sexual harassment have survived motions to dismiss
and are pending in the federal district courts,'153 and more such cases
are certain to be filed.
Congress added RICO to the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970154 to cope with the perceived "infiltration of organized crime
and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate
commerce."'155 In so doing, Congress sought "the eradication of or-
ganized crime in the United States. . . by providing enhanced sanc-
tions and new remedies ....
One of the new remedies created by Congress was a private right
of action in favor of those who were injured in their "business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962," which contains
the criminal provisions of RICO.57 Thus, the civil cause of action
under RICO is based upon activities listed in RICO's criminal
provisions.
151. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.
152. See 2 CiV. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 29, pt. 2 at 1 (Dec. 24, 1986).
153. See Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986); Acampora v.
Boise Cascade Corp., 635 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1986).
154. 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68).
155. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 76 (1969).
156. Id.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Criminal RICO prohibits several different types of activity. It
makes unlawful the use or investment of any income derived from a
"pattern of racketeering activity" to acquire, establish, or operate an
"enterprise" in interstate commerce, 158 or to acquire or maintain an
interest in such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity.159 The provision used most frequently in labor and employ-
ment disputes provides that no person employed by or associated
with an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce may
conduct or participate in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity. 60 Finally, section 1962
makes it unlawful to conspire to commit any of these offenses.' 6
The statute defines an "enterprise" as "any individual, partner-
ship, or corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal en-
tity."'1 2 This definition has been liberally construed by the courts to
include both foreign and domestic corporations and labor
organizations. 63
A major problem which arises when RICO is used in the labor
context, which would include actions alleging sexual harassment, is
identifying a "person" distinct from the "enterprise" alleged in the
complaint. It is sometimes difficult, if not impossible, to separate the
defendant from the enterprise, which is usually a union or an em-
ployer. 64 This problem can be avoided by suing individual union of-
ficers, corporate officials, or supervisors instead of the union or the
company itself. 6 5 This is the tactic which has been used in the two
cases which have been filed to date.
This problem is in a sense the converse of the dilemma faced by
the employer who is sued under title VII because of quid pro quo
harassment committed by one of its employees against another em-
ployee. The employer generally will be vicariously liable for such
conduct by its employees (although if the harassment is of the
"harassing environment" type, the employer will not be held liable
unless it knew or should have known of the harassment and did noth-
ing to prevent it). 66
RICO defines "racketeering activity" in very broad terms as any
158. Id. § 1962(a).
159. Id. § 1962(b).
160. Id. § 1962(c).
161. Id. § 1962(d); see 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 29, pt. 2 at 1 (Dec. 24,
1986).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
163. Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO In The Public Interest: "Every-
body's Darling," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 655, 656-67 (1982).
164. See 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 29, pt. 2 at 7 (Dec. 24," 1986).
165. Id. at 8. As a practical matter, the union or corporation will often pay the
judgment for the individual defendant.
166. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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act included on a long list of state and federal crimes,16 often re-
ferred to as "predicate acts. '168 The list of predicate acts includes
state felonies such as murder, arson, bribery, and extortion;16 9 fed-
eral violations traditionally associated with organized crime involving
gambling, extortion, and narcotics;170 and various acts of white collar
crime, including securities, mail, and wire fraud.1 71 Three predicate
acts involve labor and employee relations specifically: embezzlement
of pension and welfare funds, illegal payments or loans to labor un-
ions and bribery of union officials in violation of the Taft-Hartley
Act, and embezzlement of union funds.17 2
A "pattern of racketeering activity" is defined merely as two or
more acts of racketeering activity committed within ten years of
each other, as long as one of the acts occurred after the effective
date of the Act."'
Violations of RICO are punishable by maximum criminal penal-
ties of a $25,000 fine, a twenty-year prison term, and criminal forfei-
ture of property,17 4 by civil remedies available to the United States
government,1 7 5 and by private civil remedies for treble damages and
attorneys' fees.17 ' This private right of action accrues to "[a]ny per-
son injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962. ''"17 Only economic damages to business or property are
recoverable, not personal injuries, and the injuries must have been
caused by a substantive RICO violation.177 However, this still repre-
sents a significant advantage over a title VII action in that these
tangible economic losses will be trebled and recovered threefold
under RICO.17 9
In the first reported case dealing with the use of civil RICO as a
remedy for alleged sexual harassment, the United States District
Court for Massachusetts denied a motion to dismiss a complaint filed
by a female construction worker against three union officials alleging
167. See Stafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 175, at 657.
168. See Nathan, Civil RICO, 29 PRAC. LAW. 11, 16-17 (Dec. 1983).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a)(A).
170. Id. § 1961(1)(A), (D).
171. Id.
172. Id. § 1961(1)(B), (C).
173. Id. § 1961(5).
174. Id. § 1963(a).
175. Id. § 1964(a).
176. Id. § 1964(c).
177. Id.
178. 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 29, pt. 2. at 2.
179. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
that their continued sexual harassment drove her from her job.18 0
Rosa Elizabeth Hunt was employed as a carpenter's apprentice
with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
Local 40 (Local 40).18 Hunt's agreement with Local 40 made the
local reponsible for finding employment for Hunt. The Perini Corpo-
ration employed Hunt from September 1981 until June 1983,182 at a
construction site at Harvard Square, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
While employed at the Harvard Square site, Hunt allegedly was
sexually harassed and subject to sex discrimination on numerous oc-
casions. She alleged that a fellow employee, William Freeman, com-
mitted assault and battery upon her. After she filed a criminal com-
plaint against Freeman, union officials called Hunt to a meeting. The
officials, Bryant and Weatherbee, Hunt alleged, took the opportunity
to accuse her of being responsible for the assault. Moreover, they
displayed sexually discriminatory intent toward Hunt, demanding
that she withdraw her criminal complaint. Thus, coerced and intimi-
dated, Hunt withdrew her criminal complaint against Freeman.18 3
Furthermore, Hunt had, on a subsequent date, met with one of the
officials (Weatherbee) present at the prior meeting to tell him of her
continued subjection to sex discrimination and sexual harassment at
the Harvard Square site. Weatherbee allegedly condoned these inci-
dents; indeed, he refused to do anything to halt their future occur-
rence, even though his position as an officer of Local 40 enabled him
to do so.
In March 1984, Hunt worked at a different construction site in
Cambridge at Local 40's direction. Again, Hunt suffered from acts
of sexual harassment and sex discrimination while employed at the
new site, although she was employed by a different employer, the
Ceco Corporation, a subcontractor to defendant Turner Construction
Corporation.
On March 26 and 27, 1984, the shop steward of Local 40, Shaw,
approached Hunt and tried to coerce her into purchasing raffle tick-
ets for the so-called "Local 40 Political Action Fund." Shaw alleg-
edly threatened Hunt with personal injury if she refused to buy the
tickets. After leaving the worksite, frightened that she might be
physically hurt or lose her job, Hunt contacted Weatherbee, hoping
he would protect her against such threats.
Weatherbee refused to act. Hunt returned to the site on March
27, 1984, and met with Shaw and Turner Construction's superinten-
dent, Dirksmeir. Shaw again threatened Hunt with physical harm, in
Dirksmeir's presence, but Dirksmeir also refused to do anything to
180. Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986).
181. Id. at 1098.
182. Id. at 1099.
183. Id.
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help Hunt. Fearing for her safety, Hunt left, never to return to work
as a Local 40 carpenter. 84
On September 21, 1984, Hunt filed her lawsuit against three offi-
cials of Local 40, including Weatherbee and Shaw, and against Tur-
ner Construction and Dirksmeir. Her lawsuit included civil RICO
claims, claims under the Civil Rights Act,185 and claims under the
Landrum-Griffin Act,186 as well as pendent state claims alleging civil
rights violations and civil conspiracy. Hunt filed civil RICO claims
against Weatherbee and Bryant.18 7
Hunt alleged as predicate acts of racketeering activity
Weatherbee and Bryant's coercion of Hunt to withdraw her criminal
complaint against Freeman (obstruction of justice under state law),
and Shaw's coercive attempt to force Hunt to buy raffle tickets for
the Local 40 Political Action Fund (extortion prohibited by state
law). Hunt contended that these two predicate acts showed a pattern
of racketeering activity under the RICO statute.'88
Ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss the RICO claims, the
court found first that Hunt properly alleged an injury to "business or
property" as required by section 1964(c) of RICO. The court noted
that in the antitrust context of the Clayton Act, "federal courts have
frequently concluded that the loss of employment constitutes an in-
jury to one's business or property,"'18 9 and found no reason to apply a
different rule where Hunt alleged "that the defendants' actions
forced her out of her job as a carpenter and disabled her from pursu-
ing such work in the future."'190
The defendants argued that their alleged threats and coercion
against Hunt to convince her to drop her criminal complaint were
unrelated to their positions as officers of Local 40 and conferred no
benefit upon the union. Therefore, they argued, there was no connec-
tion between this predicate offense and the "enterprise," or Local 40
- no showing of the "nexus" required to sustain a RICO claim.19'
The court disagreed, noting that "there is a sufficient nexus between
the predicate offenses and the enterprise if the defendant (1) is ena-
bled to commit the predicate offense solely by virtue of his position
184. Id.
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2), 1985(3), 1986.
186. 29 U.S.C. § 101.
187. 626 F. Supp. at 1098-99.
188. Id. at 1101.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1102.
in the enterprise or his involvement in or control over its affairs, or
(2) the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that enter-
prise." '92 The court held that "surely it was only due to their posi-
tions of authority in the union that Weatherbee and Bryant had the
opportunity and power to make a credible threat against Hunt," and
that Hunt had indeed satisfied the requirements of alleging a suffi-
cient nexus between the predicate acts and the affairs of Local 40.193
The courts have used the same argument in finding that an em-
ployer is strictly and vicariously liable under title VII for quid pro
quo discrimination committed by one of its employees against an-
other; that is, that the authority granted to the supervising employee
by the employer enables the supervising employee to extort sexual
favors from subordinate employees.194
Weatherbee and Bryant also contended that the incident involving
the sale of raffle tickets did not qualify as a predicate offense be-
cause Shaw, the shop steward, may have been their agent, but acted
in this instance outside the scope of his authority."9 5 The court found
that it would be improper to dismiss Hunt's claim because if proved,
her allegations might show "that Weatherbee, Bryant, and Shaw
were acting together to maximize the proceeds for the Local 40 Po-
litical Action Fund, and that Weatherbee and Bryant sanctioned
Shaw's extortionate acts to further this objective." '
After the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Company,'19 Weatherbee and Bryant filed a supplemental brief. The
brief argued that, assuming Hunt adequately had alleged two predi-
cate offenses, those offenses-did not constitute a "pattern of racket-
eering activity" within the meaning of RICO.198 An analogous argu-
ment often made under title VII is that proof of a "harassing envi-
ronment" requires proof of many acts over a period of time. In the
RICO case, Weatherbee and Bryant asserted that the two acts were
simply "isolated incidents, occurring three years apart, [and] had no
relationship to one another." '99
The court ruled that because Hunt "alleged that the two predicate
acts were simply two examples of a prolonged pattern and practice
of sexual harassment" and discrimination, made "specific allegations
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 21 & 30 and accompanying text.
195. 626 F. Supp. at 1102.
196. Id. at 1103.
197. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). In that decision, the Supreme Court emphasized that
while two predicate acts are necessary to constitute a pattern, they may not be sufficient
to do so, saying that "[i]n common parlance, two of anything do not generally form a
pattern.' The legislative history supports the view that two isolated acts of racketeering
activity do not constitute a pattern . . . ." Id. at 496 n.14.
198. 626 F. Supp. at 1103; 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
199. 626 F. Supp. at 1103.
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of other instances of sexual harassment and discrimination directed
toward her personally, and .. alleged that Weatherbee and Bryant
knowingly encouraged systematic discrimination against other fe-
male members of Local 40," these allegations "may be sufficient to
demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity."200 Thus, the court
denied the motion to dismiss the civil RICO claims. x
Two months later, the United States District Court for New
Jersey ruled that a plaintiff alleging sexual harassment had standing
to sue under RICO. 202 Plaintiff Arlene Acampora was the purchas-
ing manager at the Pennsauken office of Boise Cascade's Office
Products Division, where defendant James Tisony worked as the op-
erations manager.20 Acampora alleged that Tisony was stealing
from the company in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 659, which is one of
the predicate offenses listed in the definition of "racketeering activ-
ity" found in the RICO statute.0 4 Acampora further alleged that
she discovered Tisony's illegal racketeering activity and that because
of her discovery of the thefts and the fact that she was female,
Tisony sexually harassed her and eventually caused her to lose her
job.20 5
Tisony contended that Acampora's RICO claim should be dis-
missed because she did not properly plead the predicate acts, and
that Acampora's alleged injury was not caused by the alleged pat-
tern of racketeering.206 The court agreed that the plaintiff should be
required to amend her complaint to fully allege violations of 18
U.S.C. § 659, and gave her twenty days to do S0.207 The court then
held that the plaintiff did indeed have standing to sue under RICO,
finding that her allegations that her discovery of the defendant's ille-
gal activity caused him to sexually harass her and ensure that she
lost her job constituted a claim for "injury to business or property"
by reason of Tisony's alleged violation of RICO.208
Defendant Tisony's final contention was that the alleged racke-
teering activity was "not sufficiently connected to [his] participation
in the conduct of the enterprise to state a RICO violation" because
200. Id. at 1103-04.
201. Id.
202. Acampora v. Boise Cascade Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1986).
203. Id. at 67.
204. Id. at 68.
205. Id. at 67.
206. Id. at 67-68.
207. Id. at 68.
208. Id. at 68-69.
it "inured to his personal benefit and did not further the interests of
the enterprise .. ".. 209 The court disagreed, reiterating the test
enunciated by the Hunt court: that "one conducts the activities of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering when (1) one is enabled
to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position in
the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the
enterprise, or (2) the predicate offenses are related to the activities
of that enterprise." 210 The court found that Acampora's complaint
"sufficiently allege[d] that defendant Tisony [used] his position in
the enterprise to engage in racketeering activity, and [that it there-
fore] state[d] a claim under RICO." ''
Three obvious disadvantages of suing under RICO emerge from
this discussion. First, unlike tort law and title VII, RICO is an ex-
tremely complex compound statute, and many plaintiffs are unable
to properly plead their RICO claims. Therefore, the RICO statute
magnifies some of the procedural hassles encountered in title VII
actions.
Second, RICO, like title VII, is less desirable than a tort action
for the plaintiff who wishes to recover for emotional harms. RICO
permits recovery only for economic injury to business or property
(though this recovery is treble the plaintiff's actual losses), and no
compensatory damages for the physical and emotional harms arising
from the harassment may be recovered.
Finally, a plaintiff who has been the victim of a harassing environ-
ment would find RICO to be a rather futile gesture, for it would be
extremely difficult to prove injury to business or property as the re-
sult of this environment unless the plaintiff were constructively dis-
charged by the harassment.
CONCLUSION
Workers who have been subjected to sexual harassment have
found both advantages and disadvantages in employing theories of
recovery outside title VII. Discrimination claims are certainly cogni-
zable under the Constitution's equal protection clause, but the victim
of a harassing environment would be very unlikely to recover against
her employer under this theory: it would be nearly impossible to
show the intentional discrimination required for recovery under the
Constitution if the employer had no knowledge of the harassing
environment.
The traditional tort causes of action for sexual harassment offer
the possibility of a far more lucrative remedy than is possible under
209. Id. at 69.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 70.
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title VII. The successful tort plaintiff may obtain compensatory
damages for physical and emotional harm, and may in appropriate
cases recover punitive damages as well. Other advantages of the tort
theories over title VII include the availability of jury trial, a longer
statute of limitations, and a more routine procedural framework.
One disadvantage of the tort causes of action in a sexual harass-
ment context is the need to prove strict or vicarious liability of the
employer for intentional torts committed by its employees. Another
disadvantage is that sexual harassment provides no independent tort
cause of action. Because many sexual harassment suits do not fit
neatly into the pigeonholes provided by the existing causes of action,
recovery under a tort theory may often be unlikely.
Finally, although the civil RICO cause of action does make possi-
ble a federal forum, and mandates the recovery of treble damages
and attorneys' fees, cognizable harms are limited to economic inju-
ries to business or property. In this sense, RICO shares the disadvan-
tage of employing title VII, in that only tangible economic losses will
be compensated. However, civil RICO plaintiffs are, like title VII
plaintiffs, able to impose strict or vicarious liability on the employer
for the acts of its employees.
As the law of sexual harassment grows and develops, so will theo-
ries of recovery outside title VII. Although only the passage of time
and accumulation of court decisions will flesh out the boundaries of
these additional recoveries, it is already apparent that plaintiffs' op-
portunities for recovery have expanded well beyond title VII, and
will continue to expand.

